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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001293

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [CH](#) [JA](#) [ASEAN](#)

SUBJECT: MOFA CHINA DIVISION DIRECTOR ON JAPAN-CHINA
RELATIONS

REF: A. A) TOKYO 001166

[1](#)B. B) 001208

Classified By: Political Section Deputy Carol Reynolds. Reasons:1.4(b/d).

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: MOFA China Division Director Izumi told POL Deputy March 3 that Japan had strongly protested the PRC's proposed anti-secession law aimed at Taiwan, citing recent hopeful steps and the need for a peaceful resolution of the cross-Straits issue as arguing against such legislation. He urged U.S.-Japan coordination on the issue. Izumi opined that President Hu's inability to consolidate his authority has made him vulnerable to hardliners on Taiwan and Japan. Boosting Hu might redound to U.S. and Japanese interests, as would strengthening ASEAN, he suggested. End Summary.

PRC Anti-Secession Law

[1](#)2. (C) During a March 3 meeting with POL Deputy, MOFA Asian Affairs Bureau China Division Director Hiroyasu Izumi expanded on GOJ February 22 and 23 discussions with visiting State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Director Sun Yafu (ref A). In discussing the proposed anti-secession legislation with Sun, MOFA interlocutors made four basic points. First, the proposed legislation would upset hopes for following up recent positive steps in cross-Straits relations, such as Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's acceptance of "the results of the 1992 Hong Kong meeting," PRC President Hu Jintao's relatively mild language on Taiwan in his New Year's speech, and the agreement on direct charter flights during the Lunar New Year. With these small, but important steps toward a cross-Straits dialogue, why would the PRC risk roiling the cross-Straits waters with anti-secession legislation? Second, MOFA laid down a marker that Taiwan issues were of interest to Japan. While the PRC may view Taiwan as a domestic matter, MOFA asserted that cross-Straits relations have regional implications. Third, MOFA expressed its strong concerns regarding the possibility that the text of the anti-secession law would mention the use of force against Taiwan. Japan strongly opposes the use of force to settle cross-Straits matters. Fourth, MOFA called on the PRC to establish as soon as possible a cross-Straits dialogue in order to find a peaceful resolution to the cross-Straits issue.

[1](#)3. (C) Izumi commented that he did not know how the PRC would take the GOJ assertions, but he felt that MOFA had sent a clear message. He noted that LDP, DPJ and Komeito Party leaders had each sent similar messages to the PRC. Izumi urged U.S.-Japan coordination on the anti-secession law.

Hu Vulnerable on Taiwan and Japan

[1](#)4. (C) Commenting that Hu Jintao had yet to consolidate his authority, Izumi said that China's cross-Straits policy was a good indicator of Hu Jintao's hold on power because it was such a sensitive matter. He expressed concerns that former President Jiang Zemin would be able to include hard-line language in the anti-secession law. Having stepped down from office, Jiang Zemin may now freely snipe at Hu's handling of important issues, and Taiwan is an area where Hu is particularly vulnerable. Izumi cited talk circulating in Beijing of Japan's supposed betrayal on Taiwan issues on the heels of PM Koizumi's amicable bilateral summit meetings with Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao late last year. GOJ approval of a visit by former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui and the inclusion of Taiwan in the Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee are cited as evidence of Japanese perfidy, Izumi said.

[1](#)5. (C) Hu's inability to determine PRC policy toward Japan has led to drift in the political relationship, Izumi noted. He attributed Beijing's inability to get past the issue of PM Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine to Hu's relative weakness. Consequently, that one issue has been allowed to block progress on bilateral matters such as the conflict over Japan's EEZ in the East China Sea. Izumi hopes that Premier Wen will accept Japan's invitation to attend the Aichi Expo later this year as a means of improving bilateral relations. To date, State Council Vice Premier Wu Yi plans to lead

China's delegation to the Expo. In the meantime, he suggested, the United States and Japan should try to think of ways of boosting President Hu in order to strengthen China's foreign policy moderates. Secretary Rice's upcoming visit to Beijing will be helpful, as would trilateral talks on security issues among the United States, Japan, and China, Izumi commented.

Relations with ASEAN

16. (C) In the context of guiding China's foreign policy, Izumi suggested it would also be helpful for the United States and Japan to take steps to strengthen ASEAN as an institution. Currently, China is able to "pick off" Southeast Asian countries individually, often using Thailand as a messenger, but if ASEAN were a stronger institution, it would stand a better chance of standing up to China. The United States, Japan and Australia should consider how to strengthen Indonesia's role in ASEAN, he advised.

Comment

17. (C) Izumi had just returned from Beijing where he had accompanied Asian Affairs Bureau DG Sasae (ref B) and his comments may reflect frustration with the PRC's insistence on holding the bilateral relationship hostage to the Yasukuni issue. Izumi's suggestion for U.S.-Japan-PRC trilateral talks on security issues was the first we had heard this proposal. We are uncertain the degree to which such talks have wider GOJ support.
MICHALAK